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The Clayton Act, went into effect October 15, 1914. Its prin-
cipal purpose as stated by its sponsors was to "make unlawful
certain trade practices which, as a rule, singly and in them-
selves, are not covered by the Act of July 2, 1890, or other
existing anti-trust acts, and thus, by making these practices il-
legal, to arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies, and monopo-
lies in their incipiency and before consummation." 2 These
practices, which Congress felt warranted specific condemnation
were (a) price discriminations, (b) exclusive and tying con-
tracts, (c) intercorporate stockholding, particularly by holding
companies and (d) interlocking directorates where the effect of
these practices may be substantially to lessen competition or to
tend to create monopolies. The test of lawfulness laid down by
Congress, so far as these practices are concerned, is perhaps
more strict than that previously applied by the courts under the
Sherman Act. The test is that of probable effect, and if the
effect "may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce" the practice is
unlawful. The use of the words "may be" makes the test not
whether the specified practice unduly restricts competition, but
whether its probable effect, if permitted to continue, will be to
lessen competition substantially or tend to create a monopoly.3
This act represented an entirely new development in the regula-
tion of industry, in that instead of being made a criminal stat-
ute as originally drawn, it was amended so that its enforce-
ment by public action was left to the newly created Federal
Trade Commission. It was felt, in view of the experimental
character of the legislation, that the harshness of the criminal
law should not be applied.4
Price discrimbwntions. Subject to seven exceptions, section 2
of the Clayton Act makes it unlawful for any person in the
Continued from the December 1926 issue, 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 207.
'38 Stat. 730, (1914) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) §§ 8835a et seq.
2 SEN. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong. 2d Sess., Ser. No. 6553, at 1.
3 Standard Fashion Co. v. BlcGrane-Houston Co., 253 U. S. 340, 42 Sup.
Ct. 360 (1922) ; United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 258 U. S.
451, 42 Sup. Ct. 363 (1922) ; see same case reported below in 2G4 Fed. 138,
162-3 (E. D. Mo. 1920).
4 Supra note 2, at 42.
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course of commerce 5 to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities, which commodities are sold for use,
consumption or resale within the United States, or any place
within the jurisdiction of the United States where the effect of
such discriminations may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. It will
be noted that this prohibition does not apply to goods sold here
in this country or abroad which are intended solely for export
trade.0 The exceptions to the section provide that it shall not
prohibit discrimination in price (1) on account of difference
in grade, (2) or quality, (3) or quantity, (4) or cost of selling,
(5) or cost of transportation, (6) or when made in good faith
to meet competition, nor (7) prevent any person from selecting
his own customers in bona fide transactions not in restraint of
trade.
The purpose of this provision is explained by Congress in the
following language:
"In the past it has been a most common practice of great and
powerful combinations engaged in commerce-notably the Stand-
ard Oil Co., and the American Tobacco Co., and others of less
notoriety, but of great influence-to lower prices of their com-
modities, oftentimes below the cost of production in certain com-
munities and sections where they bad competition, with the in-
tent to destroy and make unprofitable the business of their com-
petitors, and with the ultimate purpose in view of thereby ac-
quiring a monopoly in the particular locality or section in which
the discriminating price is made. Every concern that engages
in this evil practice must of necessity recoup its losses in the
particular communities or sections where their commodities are
sold below cost or without a fair profit by raising the price
of this same class of commodities above their fair market value
in other sections or communities. Such a system or practice
is so manifestly unfair and unjust, not only to competitors who
are directly injured thereby but to the general public, that your
committee is strongly of the opinion that the present antitrust
laws ought to be supplemented by making this particular form
of discrimination a specific offense under the law when prac-
ticed by those engaged in commerce." 7
Some nineteen states had already enacted laws against price
discriminations which, however, could be easily circumvented by
a concern with a national distribution by merely keeping the
price in the particular state uniform although making different
prices elsewhere, and this act was designed to correct the situa-
tion.
5 Commerce as defined in the act includes interstate and foreign com-
merce and commerce in and between any places under the jurisdiction of
the United States (with the exception of the Philippine Islands) or
between such places and any foreign nations.
6 H. R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong. 2d Sess., Ser. No. 6559, at 8.
7 Supra note 6.
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The maze of generally-worded exceptions to this section made
it practically worthless as a regulatory measure and the deci-
sions of the courts have still further restricted its application.
Two important cases arising out of the struggle between whole-
salers and co-operative groups of retailers, and between chain
stores and independent retailers have been decided. In the first,
involving the granting of larger discounts by the Mennen Com-
pany to wholesalers on quantity purchases than to groups of re-
tailers organized in the corporate form or otherwise for the
purchase of similar quantities of merchandise for their members,
the court held that even though such a discrimination tended to
decrease competition among the two different groups of the
company's customers it was not a violation of the law. The
court decided that the words "where the effect of such dis-
cr mination may be to substantially lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce" applied only to
competition between the party to the discrimination and his com-
petitors, on the ground that the wording in the act as originally
introduced prohibited discrimination "with the purpose or in-
tent thereby to destroy or wrongfully injure the business of a
competitor of either such purchaser or seller." The subsequent
change of wording in the court's opinion restricted the scope of
the section and eliminated discriminatory practices designed by
a powerful manufacturer to restrict and control competition
among his distributors. The court took this position even though
the chairman of the House Committee in reporting the bill stated
that the change was made to give this section "more elasticity
and breadth." 1
In a later case the court held the granting of discounts in
price by a large cracker manufacturer based upon total monthly
purchases by its customers adopted partly in order to induce
frequent purchases and thus insure freshness and quality when
the product reaches the consumer, such discounts being given to
chain store organizations on the total of the separate purchases
of their store managers but being refused to pools of independent
retailers organized to combat the competition of the chain stores,
was not a violation of this section although it tends substan-
tially to lessen competition among such buyers. 0 It may be safely
said, therefore, that this section will be successfully employed by
the Commission only in most flagrant cases of price discrimi-
8 Mennen Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d,
1923)-
9 51 CONG. REC. 16273. A writ of certiorari was denied by the Supreme
Court, 262 U. S. 759, 43 Sup. Ct. 705 (1922) so the limited application of
this section is finally established.
10 Natl Biscuit Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 299 Fed. 733 (C. C. A.
2d, 1924); certiorari denied, 266 U. S. 613, 45 Sup. CL 95 (1924).
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nation clearly designed to injure competitors of the party mak-
ing the discrimination.
Tying and exclusive contracts. Section 3 of the Clayton Act
makes it unlawful for any person to lease or make a sale or con-
tract for sale of any commodity for use, consumption, or re-
sale within the United States or any place under the jurisdic-
tion of the United States (except the Philippine Islands) or to
fix the price thereof, or discount or rebate from such price, on
the condition of understanding that the lessee or purchaser shall
not use or deal in the commodities of a competitor of the person
making the sale or lease, where the effect of such action may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce. The House Committee on the Judiciary,
in presenting its report on the measure, assigned a number of
reasons for the adoption of this section. It was asserted that
the practice enabled a powerful manufacturer to hamper the
dealer in the conduct of his own business; that it tended to
drive competitive articles from the market and often to create
a complete local monopoly in many small towns; that it resulted
in higher prices to the consumer; that the public is often put
to the inconvenience of securing many commodities it desires
from other communities or through mail order houses and that
when used by very large concerns such as a few mentioned in
the report the practice becomes "one of the greatest agencies
and instrumentalities of monopoly ever devised by the brain
of man." 11 The section was not designed to apply to bona fide
agency contracts.12
The courts in tvo cases have held that contracts made by
dress pattern manufacturers with dealers representing a large
percentage of all the dealers in the United States, requiring them
not to deal in the goods of competing manufacturers, violate
this section. 3 But a contract made by a manufacturer, repre-
senting only 1% of the total production in a highly competitive
industry, requiring his dealers to refrain from dealing in the
products of competitors has been held not to be a violation
of this section because of the absence of any probable effect in
substantially lessening competition.1
4
Another form of contract having much the same competitive
"I Supra note 6', at 11-13.
12Ibid. at 11. See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 270 Fed. 881 (C. C. A. 3d, 1921), aff'd 260 U. S. 568, 43 Sup. Ct.
210 (1923).
'2 Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., supra note 3; ibid.
259 Fed. '793 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919) ; ibid. 254 Fed. 493 (D. Mass. 1918);
Butterick Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 4 Fed. (2d) 910 (C. C. A. 2d,
1925) ; certiorari denied, 267 U. S. 602, 45 Sup. Ct. 462 (1924).
'4 Pearsall Butter Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 292 Fed. 720 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1923).
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effect is a contract often used in the past by manufacturers of
patented articles or other commodities in great demand, wherein
they tie up the sale of such products with other products sold
by them so as to compel buyers to purchase these other products
and thus restrict the ability of competitors to sell the same
class of products to dealers and others who are parties to such
contiacts. One of the express purposes of this section was to
reach such practices employed by very large concerns such as
tht United Shoe Mlachinery Company. The government, there-
fore, soon after the passage of the act brought suit to enjoin
the use by that company of leases containing cleverly-worded
clauses which, while they did not in express words, did in prac-
tical effect compel lessees of their patented machinery to use
only machines and supplies of their manufacture with such ma-
chinery. The Supreme Court held such clauses to be a violation
of the law, in view of the dominating position of the
United States Shoe Machinery Company in the industryY
The court further held that such a prohibition made in the pub-
lic interest to prevent monopoly, even though applicable to pat-
ented articles for which patents had been secured prior to the
passage of the act, was not an unconstitutional restriction on
the legitimate rights secured by the patents. The lower court
did however hold, and this decision was not disturbed by the
Supreme Court, that in view of the extremely delicate and in-
tricate nature of the company's machinery it was reasonable
to require the lessee to secure all duplicate parts and devices
used in the operation, repair or renewal of the patented ma-
chinery.1
6
In a number of cases involving many of the large oil compa-
nies of the United States, it was held that the leasing of gaso-
line pumps, containers and storage tanks to dealers on the con-
dition that their use should be restricted to the lessor's product,
but making no requirement that the products of competitors
should not be dealt in, was not a violation of this section in the
absence of proof of a tendency to eliminate competition or create
a monopoly. 7 Important precedents have been established under
this section, widely known in the business world, and it may be
safely said that this prohibition is having and in the future will
have a considerable effect.
15 United Shoe Machinery Co. v. United States, sup7a note 3; see also
Motion Picture Patents Co. -v. Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502, 37 Sup.
Ct. 416 (1917).
26 Supra note 3.
'7Federal Trade Commi!sion v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U. S. 463,
43 Sup. Ct. 450 (1923); Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commision,
282 Fed. 81 (C. C. A. 3d, 1 22); Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 273 Fed. 478 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); Canfield Oil Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 274 Fed. 571 (C. C. A. Gth, 1921).
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Intercorporate stockholding. Section 7 of this act makes it
unlawful for a corporation engaged in interstate or foreign com-
merce to acquire the stock of another corporation also engaged
in interstate or foreign commerce where the effect of such ac-
quisition may be substantially to lessen competition between the
two corporations or to restrain commerce in any section or com-
munity or to tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
It also is specifically directed at holding companies, i. e., cor-
porations formed, the primary purpose of which is to acquire
and hold the stock of other corporations. It prohibits the ac-
quisition by such a corporation of the stock of other corpora-
tions which are engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, where
the effect may be substantially to lessen competition between any
of such corporations or to restrain such commerce in any section
or community. There are three exceptions to this prohibition. (1)
It does not apply to the purchase of stock solely for investment,
providing no attempt is made to use the stock by voting or other-
wise to bring about a substantial lessening of competition. (2) It
does not prevent a corporation from forming subsidiary corpo-
rations and holding the stock of such corporations when the
effect is not to lessen competition substantially. (3) It does
not impair any rights in stock acquired before the passage of
the act, provided such holding was not already unlawful under
existing anti-trust statutes. Congress viewed holding compa-
nies as a "mere incorporated form of the old fashioned trust." I
This section is of great importance. The provision of the
section against stock acquisitions "where the effect of such ac-
quisition may be to substantially lessen competition between
the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the cor-
poration making the acquisition" is a rigorous prohibition
full of menace to many mergers now being formed in apparent
ignorance of its provisions. While the section does not prohibit
the acquisition by one corporation of the physical assets of
another, the complicated financial structure of many corpora-
tions makes it difficult to effect mergers without an acquisition
of stock. The court decisions seem to make this unlawful be-
tween competing corporations of any substantial size.' Plans
for evading the provisions of this statute which have involved
in their operation any stock acquisition have thus far been
unsuccessful. An interesting scheme was involved in the Alumi-
num Company case. That company, instead of purchasing di-
rectly the stock of a competitor, which as a part of its business
was milling sheet aluminum, agreed with its competitor upon a
18 Supra note 6, at 17.
19 Swift & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 8 Fed. (2d) 595 (C. C. A.
7th, 1925); Western Meat Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 4 Fed. (2d)
223 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).
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plan whereby a new corporation was to be organized to take
over the rolling mill and sheet aluminum business for a fixed
price from such competitor. This competing corporation sub-
scribed for one-third of the stock issued, the Aluminum Com-
pany subscribing for the remaining two-thirds. The plan as
carried out enabled the Aluminum Company to control, through
such acquisition of stock, the operation of the new corporation
carrying on the business formerly conducted by its competitor.
The obvious purpose of this plan was to create a situation where
it could be contended that there was no elimination of competi-
tion between the corporation acquiring the stock and the cor-
poration whose stock was acquired. The court, however, held
that by reason of the arrangements made which must be viewed
as a whole, the new corporation acquired a competing business,
which competition was immediately controlled and lessened by
the acquisition of stock control, and that the transaction also
came within the prohibition against such a stock acquisition
where the effect may be to "tend to create a monopoly." ' But
shortly thereafter the court refused to issue a restraining order
when the Aluminum Company proposed to bid in at a sheriff's
sale the various properties of which it had been compelled to
divest itself, it appearing that the competing plant had closed
because of financial difficulties and that such action was the
only means the company could take to recover a bona fide debt.21
In a more recent case the court has held that the creation by
one corporation of a new corporation to acquire the stock of a
competitor is a violation of the statute, the court holding that
it would disregard the corporate fiction under such circum-
stances.
22
The power of the Commission to compel disposition of physical
property has been a subject of litigation. It is not unlawful, so
far as this statute is concerned, for one corporation to acquire
physical assets if it does not also acquire the stock. Where stock
control of a corporation has been secured, and as a result the
corporation has been stripped of its physical assets, can the
Commission compel disposition of the property to restore the
competitive situation or is its power limited so that it can com-
pel only the disposition of the new worthless stock? One court
has held that the Commission has the power to extend its
hand to the property, even though commingled with other prop-
erty, as otherwise the transgressor would retain the fruits of
20 Aluminum Co. of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 284 Fed. 401
(C. C. A. 3d, 1922) ; certiorari denied, 261 U. S. 616, 43 Sup. CL 062 (1922).
21 Aluminum Co. of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 299 Fed. 261
(C. C. A. 3d, 1924).
22Federal Trade Commissicn v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 5 Fed. (2d) 615
(C. C. A. 3d, 1925).
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its violation of the law. 23 Another court, even though the
property had not been divested, held that the Commission could
only order the divesting of the stock and it could not order the
respondent to divest itself of the physical property. 24 As the
Swift, Thatcher and Western Meat Company cases are now pend-
ing before the Supreme Court, no authoritative statement can
be made of the scope of this section, but it is evident that its
effect upon industry may be far-reaching.
Interlocking directorates. Section 8 was directed at the evil
of centralized control of trade arising from an interlocking of
the personnel of directorates of three great classes of corpo-
rations-common carrier corporations, industrial corporations
and bank and trust corporations-which it was felt had been
established by congressional investigation. This discussion is
limited to the law as applicable to industrial corporations. The
provisions of this section relating to industrial corporations pro-
vide that no person shall serve as the director of two or more
corporations any one of which has capital surplus and undivided
profits aggregating more than $1,000,000 (other than banks,
banking associations, trust companies and common carriers) if
such corporations are or have been competitors to such an ex-
tent that the elimination of competition between them by agree-
ment would constitute a violation of any of the anti-trust laws.
It was felt by Congress that such a provision would not only
prevent the centralization of control over production and dis-
tribution but would also bring "new blood in the management
of our business enterprises." 25 This section, however, has re-
mained lifeless on the statute books.
Procedural rights. The Clayton Act also contains several pro-
visions considerably amplifying the application of the Sherman
law. The law up to this time had been designed primarily for
governmental action. it was now so enlarged as to give much
broader rights to a private party injured so that such party
would not only be more adequately protected, but the law itself
be in fact made more effective. Section 4 gives to an individual
injured in his business or property by a violation of any of
the anti-trust acts the right to sue the defendant in any dis-
trict where he resides or is found or has an agent. Section 12
provides that any anti-trust proceeding against a corporation
may be brought not only in the district in which it is an inhabi-
tant but also in any district wherein it transacts business or
may be found, and provides also for the service of process there.
Section 13 permits subpoenas to run into other federal districts.
By these amendments a private party injured is greatly aided
23Supra note 22.
24Supra note 19.
25Supra note 6, at 20.
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in the successful prosecution of a suit against any trust or com-
bine. Section 5 makes a final judgment or decree, when not
taken by consent in any suit brought by the United States for
violation of the anti-trust acts, prima facie evidence against
such defendant in any proceeding brought against him by any
other party under the anti-trust acts as to all matters with re-
spect to which the judgment or decree would be an estoppel as
between the parties to it. There is a qualification, however, that
the provision does not apply to consent decrees or judgments en-
tered into before the taling of testimony. It is also provided
that when the federal government brings a proceeding for viola-
tion of these laws the running of the statute of limitations as
to the rights of private parties with reference to any part of
the matter complained of in such proceedings shall be suspended
during the pendency of the proceeding. The chief purpose for
these provisions was to help persons of small means who are
injured in their property or business by violators of these laws':
Section 14, the so-called personal guilt provision, provides
that whenever a corporation shall violate any of the penal pro-
visions of the anti-trust laws, such violation shall be deemed to
be also that of the individual directors, officers or agents of the
corporation, who authorized, ordered, or did any of the acts con-
stituting in whole or in part such violation. Such violation is
made a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment or
both. This section has put real teeth in the law, and in recent
prosecutions officers of corporations have been fined or im-
prisoned for violation of this law.
Section 16 of the act was designed to give a more ample rem-
edy to parties injured by violation of the law. Under the Sher-
man Act a party injured had merely the right to sue for dam-
ages suffered by such violation. This section extends his rights
so as to permit him to secure relief by injunction against threat-
ened loss and damage from an impending violation of the anti-
trust laws.
At the insistence of the labor organizations of the country,
Congress in this act also placed some considerable restrictions
upon the courts in the issuance of injunctions and punishment
for contempt of court.
War legislation. With the entry of the United States into the
World War, the gigantic requirements of the government and
our allies utterly disorganized the customary processes of trade
and brought about serious shortages of supply, mounting prices
and excessive speculation which if permitted to continue might
destroy the morale of the nation. The government therefore
supplanted the competitive system with the most rigorous and
2GSupra note 6, at 14.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
far-reaching governmental control, severely curtailing compe-
tition.
In August, 1917, Congress enacted the Food and Fuel Control
Act.21a This law authorized the president to fix the prices of
wheat, coal and coke, and under its provisions the Food Adminis-
tration and the Fuel Administration were created, which by
regulation controlled the prices of these two great classes of
commodities. This act also prohibited the wilful destruction of
necessaries for the purpose of enhancing prices, the restriction
of the supply, any attempt to monopolize either locally or gen-
erally, the use of any discriminatory, unfair or deceptive prac-
tices, the making of unjust or unreasonable rates or charges,
any conspiracy to limit facilities of production or distribution,
the hoarding of necessaries, or the withholding of them from
market for the purpose of unreasonably increasing or diminish-
ing the price, or the exaction of excessive prices. To make
these provisions effective, the president was granted the power to
issue licenses to trade in such necessaries, to requisition factories
or supplies whenever necessary for the common defense, and to
prescribe regulations. Violation of the law was made a criminal
offense.
In October of the same year the Trading with the Enemy Act
was passed,26b which prohibited any kind of communication or
trading, with any subject of any nation with which the United
States was at war, or of any ally of such nation except with
the license of the president. Under this law the War Trade
Board exercised complete control over the foreign trade of the
nation.
On December 26, 1917, the president, acting under authority
granted him by the Army Appropriation Act of 19162C took
over control of the railroads of the country. In March, 1918,
Congress made further provisions for the operation of the
railroads by the president and made it a criminal offense to
interfere with their operation.263 This act, however, provided
that all pending anti-trust cases affecting the railroads should
proceed to determination as if the United States had not assumed
control over the transportation systems, but gave to the courts
jurisdiction on application of the United States to stay execution
of any final judgment or decree until such time as they deemed
proper.
In the Deficiency Appropriations Act of June 15, 1917, Con-
gress gave to the president almost complete control over the
production side of the shipping industry. In July, 1918, power
26a40 Stat. 276, (1917) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1919 Supp.) § 3115'e.
2640 Stat. 411, (1917) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1919 Supp.) 31151/a ct seq.
26039 Stat. 619, 645, (1916) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 1974a.
26d40 Stat. 451, (1918) U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1919) § 31158a et seq.
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was granted to the president to prescribe charter forms, freight
charges and the order of priority in which goods should be car-
ried in any American vessel, and to requisition vessels and ter-
minal facilities.2Ce
In April, 1918, the War Finance Corporation was created 2ct
with a capital of one-half billion dollars. This corporation was
not only given the power to make advances to enterprises aiding
in the prosecution of the War, but a Capital Issues Committee
was established which had a large control over the use of the
capital of the nation through its power to prevent or prohibit
(with certain exceptions) the sale or subscription to any issue
of securities in excess of $100,000.
In preparation for future wars the Council of National De-
fense had been created in 1916 .2-  This body in July, 1917,
created the War Industries Board which in 1918 was made di-
rectly subordinate to the president, and which developed into a
large organization establishing direct contacts with most indus-
tries of the country. Without any clear grant of statutory
power it developed two powerful methods of control: (1) a
priority system; (2) an indirect price fixing system. By the
first it determined the order in which different industries and
different concerns in an industry should be entitled to secure
their requirements of materials. Price fixing was secured by
voluntary agreements entered into by representative committees
of the different industries. While the government acting through
these different agencies did not arbitrarily fix prices and en-
deavored to secure the best judgment of patriotic men in each
industry as to the fair level of price, there was not the slightest
hesitancy in employing the threat of the use of its complete
control over the transportation systems, its power to requisition
plants and supplies, its power to prevent any person from secur-
ing materials under the priority systems and the possibility of
indictment as means to force recalcitrants to agree on a reason-
able price.
Beyond any question the administration of these laws pro-
foundly affected the situation and largely supplanted the opera-
tion of the competitive system. Moreover, as has rarely hap-
pened in the history of nations, prices fixed were fixed on a
reasonable basis to stimulate production and to keep all producers
in business, thus avoiding many of the customary evils of price
fixing. This basic policy was determined by President Wilson
personally in conferences with the Federal Trade Commission
at the beginning of the War. To reach the more efficient concerns
2ce40 Stat. 913, (1918) U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1919) § 3115 lf et
seq.
26f 40 Stat. 506, (1918) U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1919) § 3115 4/5a et Gcq.
26[:39 Stat. 619, 649, (1916) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 3115a et scq.
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which made exorbitant profits from such prices the excess-profits
tax law was enacted, under which very high graduated taxes
were imposed based upon earnings.21h Since the war the uncon-
stitutionality of action taken under some of these laws has been
established2d but during the War the force of public opinion, the
patriotism of business men and the menace of government action
under the powers granted brought far reaching results. Most
of these laws were temporary statutes for the period of the
War only.
Packers and Stockyards Act (1921). The investigations of the
meat packing industry by the Federal Trade Commission as well
as the agitation of trade organizations such as the National
Wholesale Grocers' Association and the great organizations of
farmers had aroused a belief particularly among the farmers
of the country that the packers were not only engaged in many
unfair practices but also rapidly procuring a monopoly in many
lines of food products. The great meat packers had several
times been involved in important proceedings under the anti-
trust act and powerful organizations of farmers demanded a
more thorough regulation of their activities by the Federal Trade
Commission. The packers under threat of criminal prosecution
had already entered into a consent decree with the government
whereby they agreed to withdraw from the manufacture and
sale of numerous food products. The demand for legislation was
insistent and culminated in the passage of the Packers and
Stockyards Act of 1921.27 The administration of the law, how-
ever, after a strenuous debate in Congress, was vested in the
Department of Agriculture rather than the Federal Trade Com-
mission. This act very strictly regulates the competitive prac-
tice of the packers in the meat business and the allied lines of
dairy products, poultry and eggs and also regulates the opera-
tion of stockyards and practically all persons supplying facilities
and services in connection with such stockyards. Carefully pro-
viding that the act should in no way alter or modify the exist-
ing prohibitions of the anti-trust act, the law forbids the pack-
ers from in any way monopolizing or restraining trade in any
branch of the business, or from dividing territory, apportioning
purchases, or sales, or doing any act to manipulate or control
prices, or from engaging in any anjustly discriminatory or de-
ceptive practice, or from giving any unreasonable preferences to
26h 40 Stat. 300, 302 (1917); 40 Stat. 1057, 1088 (1919); 42 Stat. 227,
271 (1921).
261 United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 41 Sup. Ct. 298
(1921) ; United States v. Marcus & Son (C. C. A. 4th) No. 2429.
2742 Stat. 159-169, (1921) U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1923) § 871614
et seq.
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any person. The constitutionality of this act, despite the neces-
sary control exercised under it over intrastate transactions in
order to protect interstate commerce, was recently upheld by the
Supreme Court.
28
The Grain Futures Act (1922). The following year the Grain
Futures Act 29 which regulates trading in futures in grain became
law. It was felt by the farming interests that future trading
led to speculation and manipulation of the markets in such a
way as often to depress prices to the producers or enhance prices
to the consumer and that such transactions in a necessity of
life were of such public interest as to warrant regulation. Broadly
speaking, this law prohibits future trading and hedging in grain
or its by-products except by owners of the physical property, or
growers, or associations of such owners or growers, or members
of boards of trade which have been designated by the Secretary
of Ag-iculture as contract markets. These so-called contract
markets were boards of trade selected by the Secretary of Agri-
culture upon their compliance with the conditions specified in
the Act, designed to eliminate abuses alleged to exist in such
exchanges. An interesting provision of this statute, harking
back to the old English cases on forestalling, makes it a mis-
demeanor subject to fine or imprisonment to knowingly or care-
lessly transmit false or misleading reports concerning grain,
market information or conditions that tend to affect the price
of grain in interstate commerce.
Qualifications of anti-trest policy. The more effective en-
forcement of the law had meanwhile created enemies. Labor
was hostile. The farmers erroneously felt the law prevented
the free development of co-operative marketing agencies. Ex-
porters feared to enter into combinations, although they were
compelled to face the competition of the German cartels, the
French comptoirs and other great combinations in foreign
countries. Business organizations were not friendly. So, as
Congress strove to strengthen the existing law, great organiza-
tions bent every effort toward weakening its application to
themselves. The labor and farm organizations, over the opposi-
tion of President Wilson, secured the insertion of a rider in the
appropriations act providing that no appropriation should be
used in the prosecution of anyone entering into an agreement
with a view to increasing wages, shortening hours or bettering
conditions of labor, or anyone co-operating to obtain and main-
tain a fair and reasonable price for farm products.'- Encour-
28 Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 097 (1922).
29 42 Stat. 998, (1922) U. S. Comp Stat. (Supp. 1923) § 8747 4/5 ct ccq.
30 38 Stat. 53, 652, 366 (1913).
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aged by their success in securing the insertion of this proviso
in the appropriations act, the farm and labor associations fought
strenuously to secure exemption from the provisions of the anti-
trust act and were finally successful in securing the first qualifi-
cations of the anti-trust policy of this country. They sequred
the insertion in the Clayton Act of section 6, which reads as
follows:
"That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agri-
cultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the pur-
poses of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted
for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof,
be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws." 81
At the time these organizations felt that these provisions made
them no longer amenable to the anti-trust acts. But the debates
in Congress clearly showed this was not the intention of Con-
gress, and the Supreme Court soon held that while this provision
did legalize such organizations so that the organizations them-
selves could not be dissolved, yet the same test of legality applied
to all their acts as applied to any person or individual under the
anti-trust laws.32
Export Trade Act (1918). Meanwhile the World War had
brought home to American business men the importance of
foreign trade to the economic life of the nation. Our increaqing
production and our enormous holdings of gold made the develop-
ment and maintenance of our export trade of prime importance.
Our dependence on foreign shipping and banking facilities was
emphasized by the compelling force of existing conditions. Our
exporters who before the War had sometimes unsuccessfully con-
tended against great trade combinations of other countries de-
manded that Americans be permitted to organize similar co-
operative groups to cope with these organizations in foreign
markets. The Federal Trade Commission after an investigation
of export trade conditions recommended to Congress that the
anti-trust acts be so amended as to permit the formation of
associations of American exporters in foreign trade. In 1918
Congress enacted the Export Trade Act, better known as the
3138 Stat. 731, (1914) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 8835f.
32 Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921);
Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459, 37 Sup. Ct. 713 (1915); see
Henderson, Co-operative Marketing Associations (1923) 23 CoL. L. Rnv. 91;
Jones, The Status of Farers' Co-operative Associations Under Federal
Law (1921) 29 JRL. OF PoL. ECON. 595.
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Webb-Pomerene law, to meet the situation.3 This law provides
that nothing contained in the Sherman Act shall be construed
as making illegal an association entered into for the sole purpose
of engaging in export trade and actzlly cngaged solely in sz ch
export trade or any act done in the course of export trade, pro-
vided the association or any act done by it alone or in co-opera-
tion with others (a) does not artificially or intentionally enhance
or depress the price within the United States of the class of
commodities exported by the association, or (b) restrain trade
within the United States, or (c) restrain the export trade of any
domestic competitor of the association. These provisos are all
the result of the fear of Congress that the close co-operation of
members within an export association would inevitably lead to
tacit understandings as to price, or restriction of production
within the United States. The supporters of the measure felt
this legislation would be of great benefit to American industry.
It was thought such an association, by controlling the bulk of
the supply available for export, could deal on a parity with combi-
nations of foreign buyers and government purchasing agencies
and thus prevent undue depression of prices. It was believed
also that distribution costs would be greatly reduced, that small
concerns through such an agency could maintain an expert
personnel, advertising campaigns, information and credit serv-
ices and many other facilities at a cost far below that possible
for a single company. It was contended, too, that such an asso-
ciation through standardization and uniform inspection could
better meet the exact needs of foreign markets, thus building
up the repute of American goods and avoiding disputes and
losses, and that these organizations would greatly strengthen
American industry and competition with the great combina-
tions of foreign companies. The results of the law have not
been so great as were expected. The World War placed Ameri-
can exporters in a most advantageous position and lessened the
need for such organization. While the copper and steel indus-
taies have formed powerful associations, not many associations
have been formed and a number of these are of little importance.
Merchant M.arine Act (1920). The great expansion of Ameri-
can shipping during the War and the exactions of foreign marine
insurance companies brought about a third qualification of our
anti-trust policy. The Mlarchant Marine Act of 1920 -4 provides
that nothing contained in the "anti-trust laws" shall be construed
as declaring illegal an association entered into by marine insur-
ance companies for the following purposes: to transact a marine
insurance and reinsurance business in the United States and in
foreign countries and to reinsure or otherwise apportion among
3340 Stat. 516, (1918) U. S. Comp Stat. (Supp. 1919) §§ 88001,1a-
883614e.
3441 Stat. 1000, (1920) U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1923) § 814611ji.
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its membership the risks undertaken by such association or any
of its component members.
Capper Volstead Act (1922). The post-war depression which
brought heavy losses to the farming sections of the United States
created a demand for remedial legislation. Members of Con-
gress from the mid-western and western states, who held the
balance of power, to a considerable extent controlled legislation.
The great difference between the price received by the farmer
for his products and the ultimate price paid for them by the con-
sumer together with the fact that the farmer was paying prices
which, comparatively speaking, were much higher than the prices
received for the commodities he sold, aroused intense resentment.
The impracticability of organizing the great number of farmers
in an effective marketing organization made it impossible for the
farmers to retard the downward movement of prices during the
depression and as a result the prices of farm products declined
violently. On the other hand, the effective organizations of
-manufacturers and distributors, combined with the tolerant atti-
tude of the government in view of the serious economic crisis
existing, enabled the manufacturers and distributors, generally
speaking, to retard the decline in prices. As a result of this and
other causes, the prices of agricultural products and of manu-
factured products were out of line, working extreme hardship
upon the farmers. The great farm organizations of the country
therefore demanded legislation legalizing co-operative market-
ing organizations, which could control the market price. In 1922
Congress enacted the Capper Volstead Act which authorized the
formation of co-operative organizations for the marketing of
agricultural products, provided they were operated for mutual
benefit and either allowed each member only one vote or limited
their dividend on stock or capital to not more than 8% per
annum, and provided they did not deal in the products of non-
members to an amount greater in value than the volume handled
for their own members. The law further provides that if the
Secretary of Agriculture has reason to believe that any such
organization monopolizes or restrains* trade to such an extent
that thei price of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced
by reason thereof, he shall issue a complaint and hold hearings.
If he finds the price of the commodity is thus being unduly en-
hanced he may issue an order upon such association to cease and
desist from such monopolization or restraint of trade. Pro-
vision is made for appeal to the United States District Court
either by the association against the order or for its enforcement
by the Secretary of Agriculture. In this vague language there
is thus introduced a novel method for indirect price fixing or
control by the Department of Agriculture. Due to the vagueness
of the wording it is unlikely that any action will ever be taken
by the Department except in case of a gross abuse of power by
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such an association. It is doubtful, however, whether this law
gives the protection that the farming interests of the country
feel it does. It is significant that the law contains no reference
to the anti-trust acts specifically limiting their application. All
it does is, first, to legalize such associations as such, and secondly,
to provide a new remedy by a different department when prices
are unduly enhanced by reason of any restraint of trade effected
by such association. Probably the Department of Justice is
still obligated to file proceedings in the courts when such organi-
zations do any acts in restraint of trade, although it could not,
of course, bring about a dissolution of such organizations. If
this is true the act is little more than a reaffirmation of the pro-
vision of section 6 of the Clayton Act already discussed. Dis-
satisfied with present conditions, the farm organizations are de-
manding further legislation of a broader nature.
UNFAIR COMPETITION
The law regulating competitive practices developed more
slowly than the law dealing with monopolies and restraints of
trade. It was but natural that peoples and governments, seeing
the injurious effects of monopolies and restraints of trade, would
first strike at the organizations causing such effects rather than
seek to analyze and prevent the methods by which such organiza-
tions procured the power to control the markets. In the middle
ages kings and queens were more interested in granting monopo-
lies to court favorites, political supporters and church dignitaries
as a means of enlarging their personal revenues or intrenching
themselves in power than they were in safeguarding the interests
of the lower classes. It was a hard-hearted world, dominated
by the soldier, and the great masses of people had very limited
rights and very few potentates eager to protect them. The Eng-
lish government for centuries, with varying degrees of success,
did endeavor to protect the people against such grossly fraudu-
lent practices as adulteration, false weights and measures and
misbranding, particularly when necessities such as bread and
ale were involved.3 The famous Assize of Bread", enacted in
1266 was but one of numerous laws thus promulgated. But
these laws, generally speaking, were designed to protect the
public rather than to protect one trader against the unfair com-
petition of another. As time passed the government, partly to
protect the public against inferior goods, partly to protect the
monopolies granted to the gilds, compelled traders in many differ-
ent industries to place trademarks on all their goods. Bakers,
ale sellers, coopers, goldsmiths, armourers, weavers, cutlers,
pewterers and producers of some other commodities were forced
35 Sidney and Beatrice Webb, The Assic of Bread (1904) 34 EcoNo-Mc
JouNbAL, 196.




thus to mark their products.'7 In this way, the goods of any
violator of the law could be detected. The enforcement of such
laws and ordinances was very uncertain because the gilds in
many towns for a considerable time controlled the town govern-
ments, and it was often their desire to be protected from unfair
competition more than any. desire to protect the public which
prompted action. But when the law was enforced the guilty
culprit usually had a most unpleasant experience. In London,
for example, the law provided that the baker of defective bread
"be drawn upon a hurdle from the Guildhall to his own house,
through the great streets where there may be most people assem-
bled, and through the midst of the great streets that are most
dirty, with the faulty loaf hanging from his neck. If a second
time he shall be found in the same transgression, let him be
drawn from the Guildhall through the great street of Chepe, in
form aforesaid, to the pillory; and let him be put upon the pil-
lory, and remain there at least one hour in the day. And the
third [time that such] default shall be found, he shall be drawn,
and the oven shall be pulled, down and the baker [made to] for-
swear the trade within the City for ever. . . ." '1
The real regulation of competitive practices during the early
part of the middle ages was by the gilds themselves. Trade was
largely localized in towns. The gilds dominated the trade and
the usual lack of a strong central government made these organi-
zations very powerful within their own towns. Gild regulations
prohibited various methods of competition and imposed fines
and other severe penalties for their violation. The enticement
of employees was prohibited by many gilds. 3 The plumbers in
London in 1365 provided that "no one of the said trade shall
oust another from his work undertaken or begun." 40 Interfer-
ence with a competitor while making a sale to a customer or dis-
paragement of a competitor's goods were likewise condemned.
For example, the Merchant Adventurers of Newcaselt-upon-Tyne
in 1669 enacted the following ordinance: 41
"Whereas divers bretheren of this Fellowshipp have made
complaint of severall disorders and unbeseeming words and ac-
tions used by severall members of this Court and theire servants,
not fit for marchants to use, in selling theire marchandise for
redressing of which and the like that may followe, it is ordered,
'3 For a valuable and scholarly treatise on this phase of government
regulation see SCHECHTER, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING
TO TRADE-MARKS (1925).
38 1 MUNIMENTA GILDHALLAE LONDONIENSIS (Rolls. Ser. 1859) 265 and
3 ibid. (1862) 83-4, quoted in SCHECHTER, op. cit. supra note 37, at 55.
39 1 CUNNINGHAM, G3ROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND COMTIERCE (6th ed.
1910) 338, 343, 350.
40 RILEY, MEMORIALS OF LONDON (1868) 322.
41 Quoted from SCHECHTER, op. cit. supra note 37, at 43; see also 4 RECORDS
OF BOROUGH OF LEICESTER 11303-1688 (Stocks' ed. 1923) 355.
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&c., That noe brother or sister shall, either by themselves, theire
servants, or anie other person whatsoever, call too, or invite anie
person, either by word or anie signe, to come to theire shopps or
sellars, while such person is either speaking with another of this
Fellowshipp or his servants, against theire owne shopps, sellar,
or houses, or goeing with them to shew them anie conunodity,
or be present with them or anie of them; but shall dilligently
attende their customers, comeing to theire owne shopps and sel-
lars. And that in thefre selling they shall not undervalue or dis-
grace theire neighbours goods, but leaveing every chapman to
his owme discretion in buying the goods he is to buy, and hath
presented to him. Upon paine that every brother or sister soe
offending shall forfeite, for the first offence, twenty shillings,
for the second forty shillings, and for the third five pounds."
In 1408, we find the Mistery of Bladesmiths providingagainst
the infringement of trademarks in a provision that "no one of
the said mistery shall counterfeit the mark of another maker
upon his own work; but let him use and put his own mark
upon his own work, on the pain aforesaid." 42 Such a practice
was originally deemed unfair because of the danger of prosecu-
tion to which the party whose marks were counterfeited was sub-
jected if the product was not marked in compliance with the law,
for trade marks were first used at the insistence of the govern-
ment in order to identify the maker of defective goods. But
before many years elapsed the good-will value of trade marks
was recognized, and some gilds through their ov.m tribunals
carefully protected the trade mark rights of their members
against imitation.43 The gilds during the period of their power
were effective agencies for preventing adulteration, short weights
and measures, and for the "abating of all guiles and trickery." 44
Naturally, few cases are to be found in the law courts during
the period of dominance of the gilds in England. The gilds were
granted monopolies of their trade in their own territory, and
very extensive powers of government. They often completely
dominated the town governments. Moreover, one of the well-
established practices of the gilds was to avoid the law courts,
and many gilds had rules compelling members under pain of
penalty to arbitrate any and all disputes before the gild tri-
bunal.4 The gilds became so arbitrary in their control of the
disputes of members that Parliament in 1504 enacted a law pro-
hibiting the enactment of such rules by the gilds but neverthe-
less they were subsequently adopted and enforced by some glds
for more than a century. 6
42 1 WELCH, HISTORY OF CTTLERS' CorPrANY OF Lo.NDON (1910) 237.
43 See SCHECHTER, Op. cit. supra note 37, at 109ff.
4 CUNNINGHAM, op. cit. supra note 39, at 338, 343.
45 1 JOHNSON, THE HISTORY OF THE WORSHIPFUL COiIPNY OF THE DIP-
ERS OF LONDON (1914)' 200. For citations to a number of such gild ordi-
nances, see SCHECHTER, op. cit. svpra note 37, at 17.
46 1 LIPSON, AN INTRODUC]ION TO THE ECONOMuIC HISTORY OF E1GCNGND
(1915) 309-310.
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The second stage of the regulation of competitive methods
began when the town governments acquired supremacy over
the gilds. They did so only after a long struggle by the inhabi-
tants of the towns. In 1437 a law was enacted providing that
all gild ordinances must be submitted to the justices of the peace
or the municipal authorities. 47 This law, enacted at the insist-
ence of the towns, resulted in a strict supervision of gild prac-
tices by some municipal authorities, and gradually the towns
acquired control over the gilds, for while the gilds could still
regulate the business methods of their members, the town au-
thorities could refuse approval to rules which were unduly re-
strictive of the rights of individuals, or prejudicial to the public
interest.
The third stage of regulation was reached when the national
government became powerful enough directly to exercise control
over the gilds. In 1503 a law was passed 48 condemning the un-
reasonable ordinances of the gilds and directing that all such
ordinances should be submitted to certain judicial officers who
were national officers. Even under this law the regulation of
business was vested in the gilds who actively exercised it and it
was only when they overstepped the bounds of reasonable regu-
lation by prejudicing the public interest that their regulations
were disapproved. Doubtless a search of old town records would
reveal a wealth of interesting data on the development of the
law of business competition during these centuries. In a some-
what similar way the great companies engaged in foreign trade
regulated competition between their own members without re-
striction until 1622 when the king issued a proclamation requir-
ing their ordinances likewise to be submitted to the privy council
for its approval.49 With the gradual breakup of the gilds under
a very slow process of disintegration, and the abolition of the
privileges of the great foreign trade companies, the national
government by the eighteenth century exercised a far-reaching
control over English trade and commerce.
Thus for several centuries there was little cause for cases in-
volving competitive methods to reach the courts. While compul-
sory arbitration of disputes between traders ruled in the gilds
and trade was highly localized as a result of the lack of trans-
portation and other instrumentalities of commerce, the gild was
a most effective agency for protecting one member from unfair
competition by a neighbor. After the town secured the power of
control over the gilds and even after the national government
exercised control over them, they continued to regulate the prac-
tices of their members subject only to the annulment of any
47 LIPsON, op. cit. supra note 46, at 370.
48 (1503). 19 Hen. VII, c. 7.
49 CUNNINGHAM, op. cit. supra note 39, at 217.
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regulations which the town or national authorities might deem
improper. But the expanding force of trade brought about by
the improvements in transportation, development of machinery,
money, banking and other facilities of commerce, disrupted the
whole local organization of industry and broke down the gild
organization. Gild monopoly clashed with gild monopoly. New
industrial towns independent of gild organizations and regula-
tions brought along powerful competition. Foreign goods came
into the markets and the era of competition slowly began. Regu-
lation, if there were any regulation, had to be national regulation.
The development of a strong national government resulted in
the creation of a national judicial system and the flexible common
law afforded an agency, although a very inadequate one, by
which one trader could secure protection against unfair tactics
by a competitor. But the wide acceptance of the laissez faire
principle in the latter part of the eighteenth century, combined
with a great emphasis laid up individual rights of liberty and
freedom of contract, made the right of competition seemingly
a justification for almost any practice.
Only within the last seventy-five years, therefore, has there
developed any substantial body of law dealing with unfair com-
petition although the origin of the law traces back into the centu-
ries. The first law affecting methods of competition grew out of
the necessity of protecting trade mark rights. In 1613 a judge
in the case of Southern v. How'" stated that he remembered a
case in the twenty-second year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth
in which the court held that a clothier was entitled to maintain
an action for the use of his mark on inferior clothing by a trader.
The recollection of the judge was adopted by the old law writers
and digesters as law.51
It may be assumed that the statement of this principle of law
by various writers of authority in the legal profession did have
some effect in a regulatory way, but for many years no further
case appears in the reports. Then, in 1742 a judge, fearful of
the possibility of monopoly, refused to grant an injunction
against an infringing trader unless fraudulent design to pass off
inferior goods or draw away patronage was proven. -2 Since the
beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the English courts
have built up a larger number of decisions which protect the
business man against infringement of his trade marks or unfair
competition.
In the American colonies there were likewise stringent regula-
tions against such practices as adulteration, false weights,
.5 Popham, 143; in the same case in Cro. Jac. 468, Doderidge, J, is quoted
as putting the date in 33 Eliz.
5 1 VINER, ABRMGS MNT (2d ed. 1791) *574; 3 BACOi, ABRGSMI:ENT
(6th rev. ed. 1793) '560.
52 Blanchard v. Hill, 2 Atk. -484 (Ch. 1742).
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measures and the like. While most of these regulations were
enacted to protect the public, a considerable number of them were
designed to prevent practices of this character which would tend
to destroy the prestige of American goods in foreign markets-
our foreign trade, of course, being of great importance to the
colonies.5 3 We find evidences also of efforts to establish the
decaying system of gild regulation in the colonies as, for example,
the establishment of the shoemakers and coopers gilds in Massa-
chusetts in 1648 with the grant of power to regulate their
trade.5
4
But the real beginning of the law of unfair competition in this
country grew out of the necessity for the protection of trade
marks. Of course, when trade was highly localized, when buyers
possessed a keen knowledge of the quality of the few commodities
they purchased and when producers and customers lived in the
same small community, there was no great need for trade marks
and less likelihood of one neighbor counterfeiting the mark of
another. But as transportation and communication began to
open up, as goods entered distant markets, the trade mark be-
came an important medium of identification of origin to the
customer in'making subsequent purchases. At the same time,
an unscrupulous trader had little compunction in endeavoring
to steal the benefit of the good will thus created by a distant
competitor.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the need for protection
against trade mark pirates began to be felt. In 1789 the General
Court of Massachusetts, in the charter of incorporation of a
cotton factory, provided that the company should attach a lead
label to all its goods on which should be affixed the seal of the
corporation, and that any persons using a like label should for-
feit and pay treble the value of the goods to which the label
was affixed.55
Two years later Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State, to
whom the House of Representatives had referred a petition of
business men asking for trade mark protection, reported that in
his opinion the grant of an exclusive right to use a trade mark
on goods, under general laws extending equal rights to all, was
desirable and suggested the enactment of a federal statute per-
mitting the recording of such marks in the District Court and
providing for the punishment of those who put the same mark on
any other goods.",
53 For examples of such legislation, see Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 82
(U. S. 1824).
54 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF IASSACHUSETTS BAY
(Shurtliff's ed. 1853) 249, 250.
55Act of February 3d, 1789, § 5. MASS. PRIVATE AND SPECIAL STATS.
(1805) 226.
56 10 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS (1832) 48.
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No action, however, was taken and it was not until 1837 that
a trade mark infringement case appears in the printed reports of
the State courts.57 In fact, up to 1870 the courts of this country
had decided but sixty-two cases involving trade marks. Lass
production, national advertising and country-wide distribution
had not yet made the trade mark so vital a factor in the creation
and maintenance of good will by affording the means for the
identification of goods to millions of consumers. Applying the
principles of the common law which protect against fraud or
the invasion of property rights, the state courts on one of these
grounds or both of them, gradually, however, built up a body of
law affording protection to the owner of a trade mark against its
unauthorized use or the use of a colorable, deceptive imitation
of it on the same class of goods by a rival trader. But a trade
mark in the legal sense defined by the courts is a very limited
form of property. It must be affixed to the article; it must dis-
tinctively indicate the origin or ownership of such article; and
it must be of such a nature that one person may, without in-
justice to others, be permitted to use it exclusively. These
early decisions afforded protection only to the owner of such a
trade mark. Interstate commerce was in the meanwhile becom-
ing of increasing importance, but as there was no federal
common law the business man in this great field of trade was
largely unprotected.
Since 1870 Congress has enacted a number of trade mark
statutes which, in practical effect, have codified the common
law of trade marks and have afforded to the owners of such
marks the rights of registration and of protection in the federal
courts so that now the owner of a registered trade mark engaged
in interstate commerce is reasonably well protected against in-
fringement.60
But the legal remedy against trade mark infringement was
at best a limited protection because of the technical nature of a
trade mark as legally defined. The fear of monopoly had caused
the courts to act with great caution in fixing the limits within
which a trader was entitled to the exclusive use of a mark-
There were, moreover, many other methods involving deceptive
imitations of name, label, color, design, dress and other features
whereby a person could fraudulently pass off his goods as and
for the goods of a successful competitor. And even though a.
person might not have an exclusive right to a word or symbol,
5 Thomson v. Winchester, 19 Pick. 214 (Mass. 1837).
5s Report of the Commissioners appointed to revise the statutez relating
to patent, trade and other marks. 3 SEN. D0. No. 20 (1902).
t9 Nnis, THE LAW oF UNF.AiR ConrrrroN AND T&%DEAUIulS (1917) 375.
6OIn 1870 Congress enacri.d a law permitting the recording of lawful
trade marks and giving rights of action for damages or an injunction in
the federal court. 16 Stat. 198. But the Act was not limited to the com-
merce power granted to the federal government in the Constitution and
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or other device, justice demanded for him protection against that
fraudulent imitation of his manner of use which was clearly
calculated to deceive the public into the belief that they were
securing his article when in fact they were buying a substitute.
This gradually forced the expansion of the law to cope with such
practices. As a result, there slowly evolved what is known as
the law of unfair competition, of which the law of trade mark
is but a part.- The basic principle underlying this law is that
no man has the right to fraudulently sell his goods as and for
the goods of a competitor.62 The basis for the rule rests in the
power of the courts to prevent fraud which in unfair competition
cases operates to injure the business and good-will of the trader
whose goods are imitated and to deceive the public.0 3  Unfair
competition cases differ from the ordinary technical trade mark
case in that the party does not have any exclusive property right
in a mark, but is merely protected from that imitation of the
features he uses to distinguish his product, when such imitation
is obviously fraudulent and calculated to deceive the public. Ex-
perience has shown that there are numerous fraudulent practices
of this character against which the business man is entitled to
protection, and some hundreds of cases have come before the
courts in the last half century steadily enlarging the meaning
of the term "unfair competition" so as to include them. As one
court has well phrased it: Ulnfair competition in trade is not con-
fined to the imitation of a trade-mark, but takes as many forms
as the ingenuity of man can devise. It may consider the imita-
tion of a sign, a trade name, a label, a wrapper, a package, or
almost any other imitation by a business rival of some distin-
was, therefore, held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Trade
Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (1879). In 1876 a criminal statute was passed
by Congress providing a fine or imprisonment or both for one who fraudu-
lently imitated the regular trade mark of another. 19 Stat. 141. This
Act became void when the previous statute of 1870 was held unconsti-
tutional. United States v. Koch, 40 Fed. 250 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1899). In
"1881 a new law was passed designed to avoid the constitutional objections
to the previous statute under the terms of which owners of trade marks
used in commerce with foreign nations or with the Indian tribe- were given
rights of registration and the law of +rade marks was codified. 21 Stat.
502. Twenty-four years later Congress enacted a law extending protection
to marks used in interstate commerce and making more definite the rights
of registration as well as conferring greater protection to trade mark
users. 33 Stat. 728, (1905) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 9495 et seq. (with
amendments). This law has been several times amended to enlarge the
protection afforded. 34 Stat. 168, incorporated into (1906) U. S. Comp.
Stat. (1916) § 9485; 35 Stat. 627, incorporated into (1900) U. S. Comp.
Stat. (1916) § 9487.
61 Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U. S, 665, 674,
21 Sup. Ct. 270, 274 (1900).
62 McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245 (1877).
63 Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co., 138 U. S. 537, 11 Sup. Ct.
396 (1891).
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guishing earmark of an established business, which the court
can see is calculated to mislead the public and lead purchasers
into the belief that they are buying the goods of the first manu-
facturer." --
While the courts for some years applied the law of unfair
competition only to such cases involving deceptive imitation of
some distinctive feature of a competitor's business which served
to identify him or his goods in the public mind, logic inevitably
compelled action by the courts against other competitive prac-
tices which were obviously fraudulent and designed to injure
competitors. Thus gradually such methods as the inducing of
breach of contract; r, the enticing of employees of competitors; c5
procuring the betrayal of business secrets; G7 and misappropria-
ting values created by competitors F, received the condemnation
of the courts.
Then hesitantly the courts enjoined the use of some coercive
methods, such as the widespread circulation, in bad faith among
competitors' customers, of threats to sue for infringement of
patents; 'l concerted efforts to shut off the sources of supply of
a competitor; 7 the intimidation or molestation of competitors
of their customers 71 and similar practices.
The common law of unfair competition, designed primarily to
protect the business man from damages to his good-will and busi-
ness, completely broke down in one respect. In so far as great
classes of competitive acts were concerned, such as adulteration
and misbranding, where the spurious article was sold as the genu-
ine without imitating the mark of a particular concern, there was
no remedy, for damage to an individual could not be proven.
Laws, therefore, were necessary to correct the injustice to honest
business, and to protect the public against fraud and deception,
and legislation of this type began to appear on the statute books.
It is best exemplified by the Food and Drugs Act of 1906, pro-
hibiting adulteration and misbranding of food and drugs.T
64 Manitowoc Malting Co. v. Milwaukee Ialting Co., 119 Wis. 5-3, 5-10,
97 N. W. 389, 390 (1903).
6r5 Rice v. Manley, 66 N. Y. 32 (1876); Sperry & Hutebinson Co. v.
Pommer, 199 Fed. 309, 314 (N. D. N. Y. 1912).
66 Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1371); Employing Printers' Club
v. Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 S. E. 353 (1905).
6
7 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Reichenbach, 79 Hun, 183 (1\% Y. App. Div. 5th
Dept. 1894).
68Nat'l Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 Fed. 294, 296
(C. C. A. 7th, 1902).
69 Emack v. Kane, Z4 Fed. 46 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1888); Dittgen v. Racine
Paper Goods Co., 164 Fed. 35 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1903).
70 Jackson v. Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592, 36 N. E. 345, 37 N. E. 14 (1893).
71 Economist Furnace Co. v. Wrought-Iron Range Co., 36 Fed. 1010
(C. C. D. Ind. 1898) ; Standard Oil Co. v. Doyle, 118 Ky. 612, 32 S. W. 271
(1904).
72 34 Stat. 768, (1906) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 8717.
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While the protection of the public was the paramount considera-
tion in the enactment of this law, the necessity of safeguarding
business from unfair competition of this type was fully dis-
cussed in the committee reports. The Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives in its
report on the measure said:
"In the competition of modern business life it becomes neces-
sary to give some protection to the legitimate manufacturer and
dealer as against his dishonest and unscrupulous rival who un-
fairly competes with imitations and spurious articles of poor
quality." 73
Other special measures dealing with such products as oleo-
margarine, cheese, flour, butter and other products have been
enacted largely at the instance of competitive interests who de-
manded protection against this and similar forms of unfair
competition.7
4
But the primary motive behind most of these measures was to
protect the public against fraud and deception, rather than to
relieve business men from unfair tactics of competitors, and of
course these particular laws were applicable only to a small
part of the trade in the innumerable commodities entering the
course of interstate commerce.
Another respect in which the law of unfair competition was
ineffective was its failure even to attempt to reach practices
which tended to create monopoly. There had developed in this
country great corporations, organized on the basis of mass pro-
duction and nationwide distribution. They were able to adopt
measures, which though not fraudulent, were unfair and tended
inevitably to destroy their smaller competitors regardless of the
efficiency of their business methods. These practices the courts
seemed helpless to combat. A huge concern could sell its goods
below cost in a small competitor's territory, easily recouping its
loss from profitable sales elsewhere, while the small concern
would inevitably be forced out of business. A large enterprise
selling some patented article or a heavily advertised product in
large demand would sell it to dealers only on condition that they
purchase the full line of the company's product. In numerous
ways the great organization could eliminate the smaller concern,
equally efficient, manufacturing even a superior article, by
methods which though in no way fraudulent inevitably tended
toward monopoly. Economists like Walker, Stevens, Jenks, Van
73 H. R. REP. No. 2118, 59th Cong. 1st Sess., Ser. No. 4906, at 8.
4 Oleomargarine Act, 24 Stat.-209 (1886) and 32 Stat. 193 (1902); Meat
Inspection Act, 26 Stat. 414 (1890), 34 Stat. 669, 674 (1906) and 34 Stat.
1256, 1260 (1907); Filled Cheese Act, 29 Stat. 253 (1896); Mixed Flour
Act, 30 Stat. 448, 469 (1898); Butter Standards, March 3, 1923, No. 519;
Pure Seeds Act, 37 Stat. 506 (1913); Filled Milk Act, March 3, 1923, No.
513; False stamping of gold and silver articles, 34 Stat. 260 (1906).
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I-ise, Seager, Seligman and many others, condemned such prac-
tices as against the public interest. Various decrees of the
federal courts had enjoined the use of such practices, but only
where they were part of a general plan before the court which
amounted to an unlawful restraint of trade. There grew up a
widespread opimon among publicists, economists and lawyers,
that the anti-trust acts failed because they operated only against
restraints which had actually been consummated. The sound
policy, it was felt, was to prevent the use of these methods by
which such restraints of trade were effectuated. At the same
time, leading business men of the country e_xpressed their belief
in the necessity for the creation of a federal commission which
would exercise in industry similar functions to those exercised
by the Interstate Commerce Commission over transportation. A
questionnaire circulated by the National Civic Federation among
sixteen thousand prominent men of the country showed an over-
whelming sentiment for the establishment of such a commission.
Hearings conducted by Congress in 1911 likewise disclosed the
same sentiment. The Progressive party in the compaign of
1912 incorporated in its platform a provision favoring the estab-
lishment of such a commission. Joseph E. Davies, United States
Commissioner of Corporations, in 1913, made a study for Presi-
dent Wilson of the anti-trust legislation of all foreign countries,
and also of the proposals made by practically all of the prominent
statesmen, economists and business men in this country. There
was a surprising unanimity of opinion that the creation of an
administrative regulative body was highly desirable. In Janu-
ary, 1914, President Wilson in his message to Congress, urged
the creation of a federal trade commission, as well as the enact-
ment of legislation expressly prohibiting specific practices which,
experience clearly demonstrated, were operating to restrain
trade. As a result the Federal Trade Commission Act and the
Clayton Act, were passed in the fall of 1914. The discussion of
the measures in committees and in Congress clearly demon-
strated a purpose to depart in important respects from the
methods employed up to that time in dealing with monopolies
and restraints of trade.
(1) It was the idea to create an administrative body composed
of men, representing both the major political parties and chosen
for long terms of office, so as to free them from political control,
who could formulate constructive regulations, sound from an
economic standpoint and carry out a uniform, stable policy.
(2) It was felt that supervisory action by such a body of
experts, who could act to prevent the practices which, if per-
mitted to continue, would create restraints and monopolies, would
be more effective than the past practice of inflicting punishment
for restr aints already effected. The theory was that by prevent-
ing the use of unfair methods of competition, monopoly could
thus be halted in its very inception.
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(3) It was felt that a broad prohibition of unfair practices,
to be administered by such an expert body, would meet changing
economic conditions, avoid the rigidity of statutory definitions
and permit of fair decisions based upon the particular facts in
each case. It was a break away from the methods employed in
the old statutes of enumeration in great detail of the practices
condemned, and an adoption of the principle which had worked
out so successfully in the Interstate Commerce Commission.
(4) It was deemed wise to have an administrative agency
which could act quickly to protect the individual trader, who
although he might have an abstract legal right of action could
not hope with his limited resources to fight legal battles against
powerful competitors.
Federal Trade Commission Act. The powers and functions
of the Federal Trade Commission, created by this legislation, are
divided into two groups-first, the power of investigation and
secondly, the power of regulation. The Commission was given
the broadest possible powers of investigation over American
industry, primarily as a means of aiding in the more effective
enforcement of the anti-trust acts through publicity; but also to
enable it more effectively to exercise its own regulatory power.
The chief regulatory power bf the Commission is set forth in
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which declares
unfair methods of competition in interstate commerce to be un-
lawful, and empowers the Commission to prevent the use of such
methods. The term "unfair methods of competition" was used
by Congress because of the fear that if the term "unfair compe-
tition" were used, the jurisdiction of the Commission might be
limited only to that group of practices already discussed which
were defined as unfair competition at the common law.
The broad general piohibition of unfair methods of competi-
bi'n was adopted because Congress deemed it impracticable to
attempt to define the many forms of unfair competition, particu-
larly in view of the fact that changing economic conditions
steadily develop new competitive methods71 The term "unfair
methods of competition" has been defined by the Supreme Court
of the United States as applicable to those practices which are
"opposed to good morals because characterized by deception, bad
faith, fraud or oppression, or as against public policy because of
their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition or create
monopoly." 76
Under the ruling of the Supreme Court, which is in accord
with the intent of Congress as shown by the committee reports,
it will be noted that unfair methods of competition are divided
into two groups.
75 H. R. CONF. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong. 2d Sess., Ser. No. 6560, at 19;
SEN. R.r. No. 596, 63d Cong. 2d Sess., at 13.
76 Federal Trade Commisson v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 427, 40 Sup. Ct.
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The first group contains those practices which are opposed to
good morals because they have in them the element of deception,
bad faith, fraud or oppression. This group of practices again
divides itself into two groups-first, those which have in them
the element of fraud, and secondly, those which have in them the
element of oppression. Typical of fraudulent practices are mis-
branding,7 false advertising,- fraudulent demonstration of com-
petitive goods, the deceptive imitation of name or trade mark "I
and any other practices, the obvious purpose of which is to
deceive the public and thereby secure an advantage over honest
competitors. Typical of the practices containing the element of
oppression are such methods as the trailing and molestation of
competitors' salesmen,'c procuring the destruction of competitors'
catalogues S and similar practices.
The second group of unfair methods of competition, as thus
defined by the Supreme Court, are those "against public policy
because of their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competi-
tion or create monopoly." The Federal Trade Commission Act
is more strict in this prohibition than the Sherman Act for it
not only clearly applies to single acts by a single individual, but
also applies to those acts having a dangerous tendency to bring
about the result prohibited by the Sherman law. One of the
purposes in the adoption of the law was to prevent the use of
those methods by which restraints of trade were elfected, and
thus to prevent the possibility of achievement of monopolies
through the use of such practices .8 2 In determining the legality
or illegality of such a practice, the court therefore ascertains
from all of the facts whether the practice has a dangerous ten-
dency unduly to hinder competition or to create a monopoly.
From the standpoint of the hindrances placed upon competition
the courts apparently feel that there are two classes of practices
which come within this prohibition.
First are those practices which unduly hinder competitors in
conducting their business. Typical of such practices are boycotts
and blacklists, 3 attempts to control the channels of distribu-
tion - and the like.
572, 575 (1919); Federal Trade Commission v. Beech Nut Packdng Co.,
257 U. S. 441, 453, 42 Sup. Ct. 150, 154 (1922).
7 Federal Trade Commission v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U. S. 433, 42
Sup. Ct. 384 (1922).
78 Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 281 Fed. 744
(C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
79 Juvenile Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Comnission, 289 Fed. 57 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1923).
so Federal Trade Commission v. Fleischmann Co., 1 FED. Tn. Co:.,-n. Dzc.
119, 120 (1918).
S1 Botsford Lbr. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, ibid. 60.
S2 Federal Trade Commission v. Beech Nut Packing Co., -tpa note 76.
83 Federal Trade Commission v. Wholesale Saddlery Ass'n, 1 FED. T.
Comm. DEC. 335 (1919); Federal Trade Commission v. Western Sugar Re-
finery, 275 Fed. 725 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921).
-4National Harness Mfrs. Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission, 268 Fed.
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The second type of undue hindrances placed upon competition
which the court seems to deem within this prohibition are volun-
tary acts of competitors to restrict competition unduly among
themselves, even though such practices may not injuriously
affect competitors of the parties engaging in such acts. Here the
unfairness of the methods employed arises from its unfairness
to the public making their use against public policy. Agree-
ments fixing prices, classifying customers, dividing territory and
similar devices, the language of the courts indicate, would be
deemed within the prohibitions.8'
While the law without qualification prohibits the use of unfair
methods of competition, it further provides that the Commission
"whenever it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding
by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public"
shall issue a complaint. While this procedure or provision was
obviously designed to give the Commission a discretion in the
issuance of complaints, 6 there has been a tendency on the part
of the courts to make public interest a jurisdictional require-
ment and to substitute their discretion for that of the Commis-
sion. 7
As to the first great group of competitive practices involving
fraud or oppression, regardless of the extent of the practices or
the number of competitors involved, the existence of such ele-
ments which are opposed to our whole public policy would seem
to provide the necessary public interest in warranting action by
the Commission.
As to the second great group of practices which involve undue
hindrance of competition, the element of public interest would
apparently not be present until the practice clearly tended to in-
terfere with the status of free, fair competition-a status which
the public policy of this country has for years fostered and sup-
ported.
Webb Export Act. The Webb Export Act, which has been
already discussed in one respect, enlarged the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission. It expressly provided that the Com-
mission should have jurisdiction over unfair methods of competi-
tion used in export trade against competitors engaged in export
705 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920); Wholesale Grocers Ass'n of El Paso v. Federal
Trade Commission, 277 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922); Western Sugar
Refinery v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 83.
85 Federal Trade Commission v. Beech Nut Packing Co., supra note 76,
at 456, 42 Sup. Ct. at 155; Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
273 Fed. 479, 482 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
88 Moir v. Federal Trade Commission, 12 Fed. (2d) 22 (C. C. A. 1st,
1926).
87 New Jersey Asbestos Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 264 Fed. 509
(C. C. A. 2d, 1920).
LAW OF BUSINESS COMPETITION
trade, even though the acts constituting such methods are done
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 3
Revenue Act of 1916. In this act, under the heading "unfair
methods of competition," the systematic dumping of foreign
products in this country at a price substantially below the actual
market value or wholesale price of such goods in the country of
their production at the time of exportation was prohibited, if it
was done with the intent of destroying, injuring or preventing
the establishment of an industry. within the United States or if
it restrained or monopolized any part of commerce in such a
product in this countr.y3 While an attempt was made to utilize
the provisions of this act in one prosecution by the Department
of Justice 0 and the Federal Trade Commission has likewise
brought one proceeding involving this practice "I both proceed-
ings were unsuccessful.
Packers and Stockya-rds Act of 1921. In 1921 the jurisdiction
of the Commission was limited in one important respect. Under
the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, the jurisdiction over
methods of competition of the meat packers in their sales of
meat, meat products, dairy products, poultry and eggs, was taken
away from the Commission and placed under the jurisdiction of
the Department of Agriculture 2- This act contains a number of
prohibitions of specific practices directed only at the meat
packers.
Tariff Act of 1922. The Tariff Act of 1922 likewise contains
a provision that "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts
in the importation of articles into the United States, or in their
sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either, the
effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure
an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United
States, or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or
to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United
States, are hereby declared unlawful. . . ." o3 The United
States Tariff Commission is given the power to issue complaints,
hold hearings and issue orders, subject to review by the courts,
and after the final findings of the Commission are transmitted to
the president, and the existence of any such unfair method or
act is established to the satisfaction of the president, he is given
the power to fix an additional duty, within specified limits, on
s8 40 Stat. 517, (1918) U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1919) § 883Od.
s0 39 Stat. 798, (1916) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 3836m.
o oUnited States v. N. Y. Sugar & Coffee Exchange, 263 U. S. 611, 44
Sup. Ct. 225 (1924).
93 Federal Trade Commission v. Crocker Bros., 4 FE. Ti. ComTi. DEc.
485 (1921).
0242 Stat. 169, (1921) U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1923) §§ 871011,s-,
8716Uy.
93 42 Stat. 943, (1922) U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1923) § 5841c-25.
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such articles imported and in extreme cases to exclude such
articles from entry into the United States.
CONCLUSION
Thus for seven centuries English speaking peoples have strug-
gled to keep the markets free. For most of this period the people
were able to secure some protection from monopolies and re-
straints of trade which affected absolute necessities of life but
even these laws, as machinery for wider distribution began to
develop, defeated their own purpose by hampering freedom of
distribution and thus caused great irregularity of prices. Aside
from farm products, howevei, England for centuries maintained
a system fostering monopolies designed to bring the maximum
of revenue into the coffers of greedy monarchs. Gild monopolies
controlled the trade of the towns, but gradually developed such
gross abuses thatthey were stripped of their powers while com-
petitive forces which even kings and queens could not control
forced their disintegration. National monopolies created by
direct grant from fhe crown so enraged the people by their
excesses that within a few years they were forced out of exist-
ence. The trade of the world was parceled out by government
grant to monopolistic companies in foreign trade, but their in-
efficiency and corruption combined with the hostility of inter-
lopers on their trade finally encompassed their destruction. The
American colonists almost immedia'tely upon their arrival in the
new country were forced to prohibit monopolistic practices and
there grew up a deep seated hostility toward monopoly in all its
forms. The efforts of the mercantile and industrial interests of
England to procure legislation which Would not only give them a
monopoly of the supply of manufactured articles going to the
colonies, but also prevent manufacturing in the colonies and
make England the sole market for the raw materials produced by
the colonists, thus depriving them of the benefit of world wide
competition was one of the great contributing factors leading to
the American Revolution. The English government, in its efforts
to protect the monopolistic privileges which had been granted
by it, adopted regulations which interfered with the freedom of
action of every man and woman. Even the shroud in which a
man was to be buried was prescribed. The innumerable exac-
tions caused grave dissatisfaction until finally the revolution in
human thought which established the rights of man and brought
about the American and French revolutions also forced a com-
plete reversal in the policy of government toward business and
ushered in a period of unregulated, unrestricted competition.
After a struggle of nearly five centuries the English people thus
forced the abandonment of a government policy designed to
foster monopoly, and at the time of the birth of our nation were
establishing a policy of unrestricted competition.
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During the Revolution several colonies had difficulties with
traders who endeavored to monopolize the supply of different
communities. Several of our states in their constitutions ex-
pressly prohibited monopoly. On the other hand, the effort of
one state to establish state monopolies forced to the Supreme
Court the constitutional issue as to whether or not a state could
grant a monopoly of trade within its borders which would
directly burden and exclude interstate and foreign commerce.
That court promptly ruled that the power did not reside in a
state thus to restrict interstate and foreign commerce. The
question as to the legal right of individuals to restrain such trade
necessarily was not answered until the development of industry
created individual organizations of combinations having the
economic power so to restrain trade. The general acceptance
of the laissez faire doctrine of unrestricted competition, the de-
velopment of our vast resources and the absence of monopolies
in this country immediately following the Revolution made mo-
nopoly a dead issue. But the excesses in banking and other com-
petitive fields soon demonstrated that some regulations were
essential to the protection of the public-that unrestricted com-
petion created abuses as vicious as those arising under monopoly.
Regulatory legislation in many forms resulted. Industry, how-
ever, remained largely free from regulation, although by the
middle of the 19th century the courts began exercising their
common law powers to reach activities in restraint of trade.
Following the Civil War there came a great development of in-
dustry. Powerful corporations came into existence. Abuses
began to multiply and in the eighties the state governments
began to regulate business competition by legislation. Then
quickly there came the enactment by the federal government of
the basic prohibition against unreasonable restraints of trade,
followed a quarter of a century later by the establishment of an
administrative tribunal for regulation and the adoption of the
second basic prohibition against the use of unfair methods of
competition. Over a period of seven centuries there has thus
come about a fundamental change in the relationship of govern-
ment to business. A policy of fostered and protected monopoly
after a trial of -ive centuries was discarded and the opposite
extreme, a policy of wholly unrestricted competition, was for a
time adopted. The unnappy effects of that policy within less
than a century resulted in the adoption of a compromise-a
policy of government regulation designed to maintain a status of
free and fair competition protecting alike against the dangers
of monopoly and the evils of uncurbed competition.
